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INTRODUCTION TO

HEGEL'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES,

BY KARL ROSENKRANZ.

(Written for the Edition of the Encyclopedia recently published in J. H. von Kirchmann's *Philosophische Bibliothek*.)

Translated from the German by THOMAS DAVIDSON.

A library, intended to include the principal philosophical treatises of ancient and modern times, could hardly lay claim to completeness without Hegel's "Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences." It is the work in which Hegel's attempts to reduce his philosophical views to an all-embracing consistent whole, are concentrated. It is the centre from which have radiated a large number of works by other hands. Even from an historical point of view, it is the most remarkable monument of one of the most important periods of speculation.

Hegel, who was born in Stuttgart in 1770, and died in Berlin in 1831, did not write much. Besides a number of criticisms belonging partly to the beginning and partly to the end of his career, he published only four works:

1. The Phenomenology of the Mind, or the Science of the Experience of Consciousness, 1807.
2. The Science of Logic, in three volumes, 1811-16.
3. The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 1817; greatly enlarged in the second edition, 1827.
4. Sketch of the Philosophy of Right, or Outlines of Natural Right and Political Science, 1821.

Everything else that has been published from his pen was edited from his manuscripts by others, after his death.

Hegel had entitled the Phenomenology of the Mind the first part of philosophy, meaning thereby an Introduction or Preparatory Course, which was to be followed by the real system, forming the second part. The warlike events of those times frustrated this plan, a circumstance which, we believe, was not unfavorable to the interests of philosophy. Had Hegel at that time publicly completed his system, he would have hampered his own future development. At that time he was not only engaged in a very close critical combat

with the philosophy of the time, but we learn, from the unpublished scientific writings of Hegel, which I have discussed at length in my Biography of him (1844), what an extraordinary influence the system of Plato was still exercising over him. It has been the custom to compare Schelling with Plato and Hegel with Aristotle, and so the notion has grown up that the Aristotelian philosophy exercised a powerful and abiding influence over him. There can be no doubt that, as far as metaphysics and psychology were concerned, it influenced him deeply; but the Platonic dialectic, especially the Parmenides, the Timæus, and the Republic of Plato, left much more lasting traces in his mind. The reader may convince himself, by consulting Hegel's History of Philosophy, that he treats Plato with much deeper research and much more in detail than Aristotle.

At the time when, as Rector of the Gymnasium at Nürnberg, he had to give instruction in philosophy, he made numerous attempts to put his ideas into a more tractable shape. The "Philosophical Propædæutic," which I edited in 1840, and which forms the eighteenth volume of his collected works, contains the main features of the different forms into which he moulded his philosophy. He then published, along with the Science of Logic, the first part of the entire system, and was able, in this independent form, which occupied three volumes, to give it far greater completeness and distinctness than would have been possible had he given it to the world at the time when he originally intended to do so. The Philosophy of Nature ought properly to have followed the Logic. In a certain sense this really took place, but only in very general outlines, namely, as a division of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, 1817.

This, then, was the first attempt to exhibit his system in its entirety. Logic, Natural Philosophy, and Psychology, were, and with good grounds, in the interest of philosophical instruction—the purposes of which the book was intended to serve—treated more in detail than Practical Philosophy, Æsthetics, and the Philosophy of Religion, to which only small paragraphs were devoted.

Ten years afterwards, when Hegel prepared a second edition of the Encyclopedia, he made altogether a new work of

it. By an entirely new treatise, prefixed as an introduction, he endeavored to provide for the necessity which the reader would feel, of making himself acquainted with the idea of philosophy from the standpoint of subjective cognition. He called this the Attitude of Thought toward Objectivity. In it he discussed the metaphysics of Leibnitz and Wolff, Anglo-French empiricism, Kantian criticism, and the Intellectualism of Intuition as held by Descartes, Jacobi, Fichte, and Schelling. His Philosophy of Nature he not only enlarged, but in many respects altered. The Practical Philosophy, likewise, in its third part, which treats of the Doctrine of Ethics, was very much extended, and, as compared with the Philosophy of Right, published in 1821, presented in a much more systematic form. The sciences of Art, Religion, and Philosophy were in like manner considerably improved, but still remained inferior to the other parts. There was throughout, in the notes, an evident effort to clear up or anticipate misunderstandings in regard to the idea of the Absolute Spirit. Some years later Hegel brought out a third edition of the Encyclopedia, in which however nothing was altered. He prefixed, however, a preface to it in which he continued his efforts to defend himself against the polemics which had been levelled at him with ever-increasing violence from all sides, in proportion as his philosophy had begun to tell upon the life of the sciences. A fourth edition of the Encyclopedia became necessary, when it was resolved to publish a collected edition of his works. Then, however, it no longer appeared in its simple form, but was edited with additions from Hegel's papers and manuscripts used in the lecture-room. Leopold von Henning undertook the Logic, Michelet the Philosophy of Nature, Boumann the Philosophy of Spirit. Thus the Encyclopedia assumed the dimensions of three large volumes.

Soon, however, the need was felt for an edition in a more compendious form, similar to the older ones. This was the reason that, in 1845, I prepared a new edition, which is generally called the fourth, owing to the fact that the edition forming the fifth, sixth and seventh volumes of the collected works has made quite another work of it, and is not counted as the fourth edition.

Such is the external history of Hegel's Encyclopedia down

to the present edition. In it, the attempt is made, by a short introduction, and by supplementary explanations at the end, to enable the reader to form as correct and complete a picture as possible of the Philosophy of Hegel as a whole. To accompany Hegel's text with notes did not seem advisable. Such a series of interruptions would destroy that unity which it is one main aim of the Encyclopedia to render salient. It would introduce a foreign tone into the language of Hegel. The continuity demanded by a systematic presentation is, besides, already sufficiently interfered with by Hegel's own notes and additions, without our carrying the process farther.

It is true that the Italian philosopher, Á. Vera, has done so, and indeed with perfectly good reason, in an edition which he has made of the Encyclopedia of Hegel. He has taken as his basis the edition in Hegel's works, and accompanied the text with additions from Hegel's other works, or, where necessity seemed to demand, with independent treatises of his own. In this way, however, his survey of the whole of Hegel's system, published in the French language in Paris, occupies seven large volumes. For our compendious purpose another method has to be adopted, and this can be justified only by the manner in which it is carried out.

Since the Philosophy of History, which is foreshadowed at the close of the Practical Philosophy, as well as the Æsthetics, the Philosophy of Religion, and the History of Philosophy, in the Encyclopedia, even in the edition of Boumann, which forms the third part of the Encyclopedia, are so much inferior, the illustrations will have a special reference to this fact, but may also, for this same reason, be very well added on at the end, as an enlargement upon his epigrammatic brevity.

The researches, which have been made to find the idea of Hegel's Philosophy, may be distinguished as the historic and the systematic.

The historic has been discussed in innumerable works. It may, therefore, be presupposed as universally known. Hegel himself has given the substance of it in the already mentioned treatise, "The Attitude of Thought toward Objectivity," which is contained in the Encyclopedia. In a work of my own—"Hegel as the National Philosopher of the Germans," Leipzig, 1870—I have endeavored to bring this subject to a settled

conclusion. I, therefore, observe in this place only that, according to my conviction, Hegel stands in a much more intimate connection with Kant than is commonly supposed, owing to the facts that between him and Kant are found Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling; and that Hegel maintained an attitude polemical toward Kant in so many particulars. There is no doubt of this, but the fact is not thereby to be got round that Hegel sought to perfect what Kant had begun. Hegel opposed the *skepsis* as held in the Kantian critique; he maintained that the idea of reason was in a positive sense absolute, and is, in so far, opposed to Kant.

But he agrees with Kant completely—

- (1) In the acknowledgment of reason as the highest principle of all knowledge;
- (2) In the dynamic comprehension of inorganic, and in the teleological comprehension of organic Nature;
- (3) In the acceptance of the superiority of the mind over Nature, in consequence of the spontaneity of self-consciousness and the autonomy of freedom.

He differs from Kant inasmuch as he

- (1) Maintains the idea of reason not only as concerns the idea of the Good, but also as concerns that of the True as a faculty of the Unconditioned. Kant had opposed the understanding to reason as its limit. Hegel made the understanding an overseer of the reason. The Unconditioned is the basis of the Conditioned; the Infinite of the Finite; the Absolute of the Relative. The definitions of thought are absolutely universal and necessary. We have the conception of the Unconditioned, the Infinite, and the Absolute. Why must their reality be restricted to the sphere of the Good? According to Kant, the theoretic reason fails on account of the unavoidable limitation of the categories of the understanding to contradictions which are insoluble. Hegel combats this. He does not deny the contradiction in conceptions, but he affirms that it resolves itself, through its opposition, into a higher unity, which constitutes the productive basis of the antithesis. It was for this reason that he laid so great a stress upon Kant's doctrine of the antinomies. The entire Dialectic of Hegel's method rests upon the thought, that, according to Kant's doctrine as it is, contradiction is unavoidable; but that, in this

case, it cannot be passed over with a merely subjective silence, on account of the alleged imbecility of our knowledge, but that it must elevate itself objectively to that unity which renders it, in the first place, conceivable.

Hegel admits with Kant that speculation cannot contradict experience. He is, therefore, an adversary to all fabricated notions which are so generously advanced in the hypothetical treatment of the sciences, and whose problematic origin is after all entirely forgotten on account of the frequency of their employment. Here belongs, for instance, the conception of an Atom, in so far as it is treated as a matter of fact. Whatever in Natural Science cannot be authenticated in a rational reality as a matter of fact, can on no reasonable grounds be maintained; this is one of the main points which Hegel, in his Nature-Philosophy, especially in his Physics, is never tired of repeating.

Kant had demanded two things for the possibility of experience: in the first place, intuition, and in the second place, the conception of the understanding. Intuition without conception is, in his opinion, blind; a conception without intuition is empty. Both must, as he expresses himself, be combined as constituent parts of cognition in order to produce a judgment. Hegel defended the conception against the charge of emptiness, asserting that it had itself for content; but he resigned the right of experience so little, that, with the exception of Aristotle, Bacon, and Kant, no philosopher has ever paid so much respect to empiricism. Hegel is, like Kant, an idealist in so far as he proceeds from the idea of self-consciousness and reason; but he is, as regards the maintenance of reason in reality, the most decided realist that ever sought to comprehend with the greatest accuracy the world of appearances, in the totality of its multiplicity, and to overcome it, by tracing out its internal connection.

(2) In regard to Natural Science, he agreed with Kant in the principles; he differed from him in the stress which he laid upon the systematic Unity of Nature. In Kant, we do not find Nature-Philosophy as an entirety. His Physical Geography is, considering his time, a very noteworthy attempt at a Cosmos, but is without a strictly scientific method. Hegel's Nature-Philosophy proceeds in an entirely speculative man-

ner from the idea of Nature, but imposes upon itself the duty of proving, in an empirical, matter-of-fact manner, each step of the Idea. No other philosopher of modern times has bequeathed such a complete Nature-Philosophy, with such distinct articulation, and in such close connection with the unity of his entire system. Hegel is seldom considered from this point of view, although it is so directly of importance to our time. Of Fichte, Schelling, as well as of Herbart, Krause, Schopenhauer, and Baader, there exists no Philosophy of Nature as an organic whole, or as a whole adjusted to the rest of their system. The reader must examine the treatment of Nature-Philosophy by Michelet, in the second part of the Encyclopedia, in order to convince himself into how great detail Hegel has carried Natural Science.

(3) In regard to the mind, Hegel originally agreed with Kant in having, on the one side, only a doctrine of consciousness; on the other, only an Ethics. As Kant came to his Anthropology, Hegel at a later period came to his doctrine of subjective mind and to a doctrine of absolute mind, which is represented in Kant partly by the æsthetic faculty of judgment, partly by religion within the bounds of pure reason, without possessing an express consciousness of the systematic relation of these various elements. In principle, Hegel also agreed with Kant as regards the idea of the mind, inasmuch as he comprehends it as a freedom, as an ideal activity, which, as its own content, creates for itself its peculiar form. But, in Kant, the centre of gravitation rests upon morality, while Hegel does not depend in so great a degree upon the power of the individual, but wishes to rear him, by communion with the objective organism of ethics, which he calls *State*, to the state of a man in whom respect for the right laid down as law, i.e. legality, is combined into ethical beauty, with the conscientious adherence to his peculiar sense of the terms Good and Morality. This lofty intuition, connected with Schiller's practical ideas, is the Hellenic trait in Hegel, which however did not lead him to abate a tittle of the sharpness and energy of the Germanic principle of individuality. The moral rigorism of Kant is transfigured by Hegel into a higher ideality reconcilable with Nature. Hegel often appears polemical toward Kant, since he opposes the reality, at which

the ethical idea in the family, in the civil community, and in the state, arrives, to the "infinite progression" of duty. The Good *must be*; in this respect he does not gainsay Kant: but the Good *is* also; and the experience that there are wicked men, that crimes are perpetrated, that outward circumstances turn out sadly for the most moral subjects, does not cancel the fact that the development of History shows us, in general, the effort of mankind to bring the will according to its truth—or, which is the same thing, the Good—into existence. The laws of nations contain the idea, which they form to themselves, of the Good.

"*Res publica*" was defined by Kant as a human commonwealth, in which not the personal caprice of an individual, but law, was the ruling power. The law enforces obedience; but, according to Hegel, the citizen of a state must conform to the law not only outwardly, formally, but he shall recognize in the law the essence of his own freedom, and shall make its realization habitually a second nature, an ethical custom. A mere state, with the coldness of formal enforcement of obedience to the existing law, did not satisfy Hegel; but the laws should animate themselves into the warmth of the self-sacrificing disposition in the will of the individual. The laws (ethical relations) inform us what we must do; we need not trouble ourselves with morbidly poring over the question what our duty may be. The state shall not only be the means of the egoism of our personal security, of our material welfare, of our intellectual culture, but must be through and through the element of self-conscious freedom, and this, in its turn, must be the highest, all-ruling aim.

In the higher spheres of mind—in Art, Religion, and in the History of Philosophy—Kant seems morally confined, prosaic, and inadequate. It is here that Hegel infinitely surpasses him, and not him alone, in sublimity, poesy, and richness of intuition. Notwithstanding all the unfinishedness in which, surprised by death, he was compelled to leave this sphere, a source is contained in it from which science will have for a long time to draw.

These intimations will suffice to show how closely Hegel developed with Kant historically, and wherein the completion of the great work, begun by Kant, was made by him. Hegel

grew by incessant self-criticism. He continually reformed himself. He was polemical towards Kant, only in order to advance upon the ground of criticism to a truer insight. Also in a systematic view he agreed with him principally in order to elaborate him further and better. In his *Architectonics*, in the doctrine of Method contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant has given the following classification of his system:

- (1) The Physiology of Pure Reason as the science of that which may be;
- (2) The Metaphysics of Nature as the science of that which is;
- (3) The Metaphysics of Morals as the science of that which ought to be.

Hegel names these three divisions the science of

- (1) The logical Idea;
- (2) Nature;
- (3) Mind.

Rationalism, Naturalism, Spiritualism, are the elements of the organic whole of Philosophy.

The logical Idea is the Absolute as a formal principle. Thought is the absolute Prius, the absolute presupposition which posits itself from itself, which we express by *reason* since Kant's time. Everything particular, peculiar, is subject to the universality and necessity of the categories of the absolute Idea. Nature and mind are in so far dependent upon reason, for they cannot be imagined at all without it. Thinking, as absolute, contains its own determinations, for which content it presupposes nothing else; but in relation to nature and mind, it is the presupposition of them as their absolute form. But this is, according to Hegel, not external and existing to them only in the discursive thinking of our consciousness, but is *immanent* in them.

Nature is in itself rational, but it forms, by its externality in space and time, the opposition of the logical Idea, for contingency comes into existence with matter. With contingency, since it is inseparable from existence in space and time, comes into existence also the possibility of irrationality. Nature realizes the conception of the Idea, but it remains contingent in the realization itself, whether the indi-

vidual reality corresponds to the idea, or whether, as it may also be expressed, the conception actually realizes itself. Nature, for example, brings forth in the spring thousands of the most gorgeous blossoms, which ought to ripen into fruit; but a frost blasts them. This is at bottom an irrational occurrence, but is, on account of the externality of existence, entirely possible. Darwin's expression, the Struggle for Existence, is one in itself entirely true, based upon a deep contemplation of nature. Hegel calls it the impotency of nature to hold firm the idea. He does not mean that nature is altogether destitute of power to realize reason, but that the realization of the idea in the individual is exposed to chance. In time and space lies the final ground of all finitude, all incompleteness, all want, all dwarfing. But the possibility of the favor of circumstances also lies in this.

Nature is the medium of the Idea, through which she attains the highest form of her existence, Mind. Mind, says Hegel expressly, is the Absolute. Its idea is, therefore, the real principle of the Absolute. This idea of Mind distinguishes Hegel's Philosophy from all others. It belongs at once to the idea of Mind that it be the thinker, but also that it realize its thinking as volition through the mediation of Nature. Hegel agrees with Kant in considering Mind as essentially free. Nature is, to be sure, existence rational in itself, but existing in unconsciousness. The mind knows what is rational, and makes use of Nature as a subordinate instrument. Freedom is its own absolute end in thinking and willing. In Nature there exists instinct but not will, for to volition belongs the idea of that which one wishes.

The consciousness of man, as of the individual mind, has still unconsciousness as an element in it. The dream is the theoretic; the desire which arises unwished-for is the practical form in which Nature continues itself within the mind. Hegel avoids mentioning God in the paragraphs of the Encyclopedia, because with this word arise at once the various ideas which men have of God in their beliefs. He makes use of the expressions, Idea, the Absolute, the Absolute Idea, the Absolute Mind, in order to satisfy the scientific consciousness. Only in the exoteric observations does he speak of God.

It is doubtful, as far as the *Encyclopedia* goes, whether he intended the Absolute only as a process in Art, Religion, and Philosophy, or whether he intended it also as a subject in and for itself. If we take the first supposition, then what we call God, and what Hegel calls the Absolute Idea, belongs solely to humanity. It is, then, the Absolute Mind in so far as it raises itself to absoluteness. Religion is, then, only an imperfect form of the fantastic idea of the Absolute, which is first truly known in Philosophy. But from the whole design of Hegel's Philosophy it is not to be supposed that Hegel held this view; for in the *Phenomenology of the Mind*, 1807, he says expressly that absolute knowledge no longer changes the content of revealed Religion. Truth is arrived at in it, as absolute, and it depends only upon the completion of the side of certainty through the idea. But he expressly teaches also in his *Philosophy of Religion*, and in his *Proofs for the Existence of God*, that God, as an absolute substance, is also an absolute subject, and, indeed, a subject in itself independent of our opinion and idea.

Mind is also only a mere word; it depends upon what is thought under it; and here the idea of freedom, which is conscious of its reason as of all truth, will forever be the only satisfactory outlet from the labyrinths of Positive Theology, from the false hell of a hypochondriac Pessimism, denying reason, as well as from the false paradise of a eudæmonistic, rotten Optimism.

Both Hegel and Kant taught this outlet, which includes within itself the absolute pain of the deepest self-abnegation.

Finally, as regards the method, the reader can enlighten himself on the correct idea of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* from the following considerations:

Science contains, as a system, the totality of all particular ideas.

These form a series in which one must be first and one last. The progress from idea to idea is in so far a continuous one. One can represent it to himself as without any interruptions. But the ideas have a relation to each other. One is more simple, more destitute of content than another. Subjectively, as a thinker, I cannot understand the higher, richer idea, if I have not understood the lower, poorer one presupposed by it. But

even this connection is the progress of the thing itself. Thus, while the idea *becomes* for me, as the person thinking it, it also assumes a form for itself. The way of the subjective cognition, therefore, can, in order to comprehend the truth, be no other than that of the objective becoming. They both must coincide in Philosophy. This method distinguishes the philosophic consciousness from the ordinary one, unconscious of the idea. I cannot comprehend a surface, if I do not know what a line is; also I cannot comprehend a line, if I do not know what a point is; but I cannot comprehend a point, if I do not know what space is; and I cannot comprehend space, if I do not know what Nature is, etc.

Nature, space, point, line, surface, etc., are a self-explaining series of these ideas. It is not I who place in the absolute continuity of space the discreteness of a point, but it is space which itself determines the discreteness of punctateness; the point is not formed by me into a line, but it is itself, which, by its own motion in space, determines the form of the line, etc.

Every idea is for itself positive, or, as it is also expressed, identical with itself. It is determined in itself. Point is a different idea from space or line; line is a different idea from point or surface, etc.; but the ideas are united by themselves, the one with the other. Hegel calls this the negativity or the self-motion, the immanent nature of the idea. The higher idea is related negatively to the lower, which is presupposed by it as a condition. It cancels it in itself. The negation of negation is hence the universal form, in which the transition from idea to idea appears. The higher idea negates the lower, but also contains it within itself. That which forms the essence of the relatively lower idea is not lost in the higher form. It remains in force as an element of it. It is no longer posited according to its exclusive determinateness existing for itself, but as a necessary element of the higher stage. The point vanishes as a point in the line, but is contained in the linearity *in* itself. A line is, in its continuity, no atomic aggregate of points, but the point is ideally existent in it. When a straight line is cut from another, this can happen only in one point.

This progress is called by Hegel the Idea, which, as being

universal, determines itself to its particularity, as a particular one, to its individualization. The point, compared with the line, is more abstract; it is the wholly universal, elementary, formless form of space-formation. But no figuration of space is imaginable without it. The line is more concrete. As a particularity it is distinguished from itself in the opposing forms of straight and curved, etc.

Every idea is, as thus determined, the result of all that have preceded it as a condition. They are collectively contained in it, but not only as an external sum, but likewise as a concrete unity. The plane or surface, for example, is no mechanical composition of lines, but the line is everywhere possible in it, and forms the boundary of the surface as its inherent element.

Every concept is opposed to two others, whose medium it forms. The line is on the one hand opposed to the point, on the other, to the surface; the surface again is on the one hand opposed to the line, on the other, to the body (mathematically so called). The precise reference, which lies in the idea of the thing, must be held firm in opposition. At its first introduction into a system, every idea can have only one antithesis immanent in it; for instance, the idea of cause and that of effect. But farther on, at other stages, an idea may gain also other relations. One and the same thing can, therefore, be placed in opposition from different standpoints. Nature is opposed to reason, i. e. to the absolute idea in the form of abstract thought, by means of its material externality. But it is also, on account of its unconsciousness and necessity, opposed to the mind as the free, self-conscious causality. It is also opposed to art in so far as it produces the Beautiful unconsciously; art, on the contrary, makes itself consciously its own, and uses nature as a means thereto.

The relatively lower ideas are metamorphosed to a higher existence, in the higher stage of the idea. Art, for instance, comprehends nature, but idealized, i. e. free from all contingency of local and temporal origin.

Hegel said, therefore, and rightly, that science is not only enlarged in its progress, but is also deepened; that with every new definition, it defines the idea of the True more truthfully. Not seldom does he use the expression, that the higher

is the truth of the lower. He would not refuse, thereby, to the latter the reality and truth which belongs to it, at its own stage, but, in comparison with the higher stage, the existence of the idea in the lower form of its being, is not the actual truth. The lower can only be actually understood from the higher, the earlier from the later, in the system according to the series of ideas. Ethics—for instance, the truth of morality—exalts the immediate naturalness of the soul's instincts to that which they should be in themselves.

The progress of the systematic cognition is, in its process, regressive, analytic, inductive, inventive, because it unfolds the absolute idea from the first elementary beginning into definitions more and more precise, and proceeds to that which is the productive basis, the final cause—the *Entelecheia*, as Aristotle expresses it—of all the preceding ideas. But it is likewise progressive, synthetic, deductive, architectonic, because it proceeds from the universal through the particular to the individual and single. The ideas form not only a series, or an arithmetical progression, wherein each has its prescribed place, but also a circle, in which the last definition again meets the first. The first definition of Hegel's system runs, Being is Being; the last, Being is Absolute Mind.

Between these two lie all the others. Hegel's first definition of the Absolute is that of the Eleatics; but it is cancelled by the next in order, "Being is Non-being." This definition is wanting in the Eleatics; for they only said, "Non-being is Non-being." Non-being presupposes Being, but, as a negation, it *is* likewise. Time, for instance, which, as future, is not yet, is therefore a non-existent; Non-being is its Being. The solution of this antinomy is the idea of Becoming, in which Being as well as Non-being are contained, partly in positive beginning, partly in a negative ceasing. Becoming is the Heraclitic, more truthful definition of Being, which has Non-being as an element of itself, not as an abstract antithesis outside of it.

But it should be borne in mind, that in these discussions Hegel does not treat of a substance, but of thoughts. They are the ideas of Being, Non-being, Becoming, with which the system originates, as with the most universal and most

undetermined definitions of the Absolute. It is very wonderful, and, notwithstanding all the study of the History of Philosophy, anything but a proof of its comprehension, that the beginning of philosophy, as Hegel here presents it, has been so often found untenable, as being a contradiction. For what does the Platonic Parmenides exist? Have not the dialectic of Being and Non-being, the struggle of the extreme Eleatics and the extreme Heraclitans, from all points of view, developed in him? Being is the most universal determinateness, which has no further content; but it is inherent in all the other definitions following it, as the most universal; also that of mind, as of the Absolute. Every other idea, besides that of abstract Being, with which a philosophy begins, demands the presupposition of the idea of Being. For him who philosophizes as a thinking subject, the same is interposed; for the consciousness must be so far formed as to elevate itself from every contingent singularity of its empirical content to the abstraction of the idea of Being. It is this side which pupil and teacher have at first to watch. Before this, the thought cannot recognize itself as thought, it is not able to complete the abstraction of Being; but this pedagogic training of the consciousness to Philosophy falls in the same elementary instruction, and the concept of Being-in-itself is independent of the act of thought, through which it is posited for us. The thought of the idea of Being is the subjective side; the idea itself, the objective side. It may be observed, in numberless statements in these inceptive forms of thought, that the demand for an absolute abstraction is not complied with, when throughout a something, if possible, a sensuous something, but not pure Being, is conjectured or imagined. To be something is a much more precise qualitative definition of Being than Being in general. Or, because the beginning and end touch each other, man makes shift to imagine under Being the Absolute as such, which, according to Hegel, is only possible at the end of the system, as its highest result in the idea of Being, as of the absolute Mind.

With this we might easily conclude these introductory remarks, but still another point merits our attention. It is the triadic form in which Hegel's Philosophy is built up. Hegel himself praises Kant, as the man who has made mention of

the triplicity of the idea. It remained hidden in Kant for this reason, that he acquired late the habit of treating everything according to the four categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But he makes the trichotomy prominent in every category which contains an antithesis and its solution. In quantity, unity is opposed to multiplicity; both are annulled in the totality, as a unity of the many. Thus it happens in quality, with position, negation, and limitation; in relation, with substantiality, causality, and reciprocity; in modality, with possibility, reality, and necessity. In the Platonic Philosophy, as well as in that of Plato himself, and in the Neo-platonic philosophers, we find also the triads of the idea. They are, in so far, nothing new in Philosophy. But Kant brought this form, as that necessary in thinking, to consciousness, without entering upon a further deduction of it. Hegel here follows Kant entirely, since he likewise holds fast Fichte's effort at a deduction of categories, as thesis, antithesis, synthesis. He completed the dialectic of the categories. For their deduction, Kant knew at first only how to aid himself with the idea of time, because he was driven by Hume first to the idea of causality, and, in the transition of the cause to the effect, to the scheme of time. Fichte sought the deduction in the consciousness, inasmuch as the Ego opposed itself to the Non-ego. Hegel banished the schematism of time, as well as the duality of consciousness, from this region. He seized the thought of the idea as of an independent process. One cannot be thought without passing over to the idea of many, opposed to it. In multiplicity, the one is at the same time posited. Multiplicity, as a numeric quantitative unity, is totality. Thus position has in negation its immanent contrary; limitation, i. e. the negative boundary, is likewise positive, etc. There is now no question that philosophers, as soon as they advance from the circle of simple, ontologic categories, as soon as the question in science is upon multilateral ideas, may fall into the most manifold error among themselves, and, therefore, into contradiction. But the method of the philosophic cognition cannot, therefore, leave off the attempt to find the actual triads, because otherwise it were without all rule for the positing of the determinations of the idea. From

the great and most comprehensive articulations of the idea, it must patiently enter upon wider distinctions. Its syntheses must not be mere additions of thesis and synthesis, but must set forth the higher principle, which sends forth the thesis and antithesis. The last is in itself the true first. With reference to us, as Aristotle expresses it, the thesis is the first; but with reference to the reality of the genesis, the last to the cognizant consciousness is the first. This is what Fichte called the synthesis, and what Hegel calls the negative unity of the idea, or the concrete universality. His *Encyclopedia* remains, therefore, a very important work, even for the future of Philosophy, because it has undertaken to accomplish, with critical consciousness, the idea of its totality according to the triadic form of the idea.

Now-a-days nothing is spoken of except the inductive method. It has for a decided problem its complete justification, and is admitted into Hegel's *Logic* as an express element of cognition. But when it is presumed that this is sufficient in itself, it is a great error. For the synthetic or deductive form has, at least, the same claim and the same necessity in certain cases. What has science become under the design of proceeding in the inductive method? An entirely methodless; inorganic reflection, narration—an entirely capricious combination—in which the reader must be glad if the authors show that they have not wholly forgotten the principles of formal logic, and, at least, attend to a fixed order. In the titles of books the expression “inductive method” makes a great show; in the preface, a great influence is exerted against the speculative philosophy by it, but in the books themselves people give themselves up to the arbitrariness of reasoning. To such hap-hazard Hegel's method forms a strong contrast. Hegel utters, in a popular manner, by means of his method, the discipline of thought in these words: “Man must know what men have said; but (he adds,) this is not so easy as people imagine.”
